AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR: RATTLING INTERNATIONAL LAW
WITH RAW POWER?
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*

The need for more dramatic targets has led to the new and somewhat exaggerated emphasis on a unilateral right
of pre-emptive self-defence by the United States. What is most striking about the new US policy is that it
portrays state-sponsored terrorism and rogue states possessing weapons of mass destruction as a new problem,
and unilateral action as the only way of dealing with them. It is dangerous to marginalise the UN and increase
the role of multilateral global coalitions or unilateral action in policing “evil-doing” as this has the potential to
supplant what initially was designed as the role of the United Nations. If decisions regarding the use of force
become nationalised, this may lead to anarchic, piecemeal, random, and unilateral enforcement of the desirable
shared goal of stamping out terrorism.

Introduction
The early 1990s marked the end of the Cold War, which paralysed the United Nations from its
inception. The event was a cause for celebration and hope. Following the historic Security
Council Summit Meeting of January 1992, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, spoke of a growing conviction “among nations large and small, that
an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the UN Charter—a United
Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and
human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, ‘social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom’.”1 The spirit of this bold and idealistic statement had been
echoed two years earlier by former President George H W Bush Sr’s statement to the United
Nations General Assembly as United States and coalition forces were gathering to push
Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army out of Kuwait:

We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership based
on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and regional
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organisations. A partnership united by principle and the rule of law … A partnership whose goals are
to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms.2

Over a decade after “Operation Desert Storm” and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, a newly assertive United States has placed considerable strain on the
existing international legal rules governing the use of force by reserving a right to use
unilateral force and off course demonstrating that practically. Reacting to the legalities and
justifications surrounding “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, Professors Richard Falk and David
Kreiger observe:

There are two main ways to ruin the UN: to ignore its relevance in war/peace situations, or to turn it
into a rubber stamp for geopolitical operations of dubious status under international law or the UN
Charter. Before September 11, Bush pursued the former approach; since then—by calling on the UN
to provide the world’s remaining superpower with its blessings for an unwarranted war—the latter.3

The crusade against terror is not a sole US enterprise; many of its fears are shared by a large
majority of the international community. The crusade should however not be allowed to numb
states and the broader international community to the need of international rule of law and the
utility of international law as central pillars of the international community. The attempt by
the “Bush administration to introduce a new principle of international law permitting ‘preemptive strike’ by a nation against another, solely at its own discretion, represents a quantum,
and highly dangerous, innovation. Were such a principle to prevail, we would have reversed
decades of advances, modest but hard won, toward peace-making and returned to an era of
dominance through might.”4
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The “War on Terror” is a noble crusade that seeks to counter the rise of international terrorism
fuelled by a combination of resurgent religious extremism, well-financed and co-ordinated
terrorist organisations, and the availability of cheap weapons technology. However the
pugnacity demonstrated by the Bush Administration in facing the threat is a source of
concern. In profound insight, in 1999, Hubert Vedrine, then Foreign Minister of France,
coined a new term describing the United States as a “hyper-puissance”, or “hyper-power”.5
The term wasn’t an expression of awe but rather a fear of the capacity of the United States to
resort to unilateralism in view of its dominant military and economic power. Perhaps the
prophesy is coming true with events subsequent to the September 11 attacks painting a
disturbing picture.

This Article seeks to sketch generally the issues that America’s “for us or against us” attitude
in the crusade against terror raises. Underpinning this commentary is the author’s conviction
that the US stance will have injurious consequences for world public order if the existing
international system based on a tenuous rule of law-based framework is allowed to morph into
a rule of might. The author acknowledges that there are many legal and political issues
regarding post September 11 United States actions, but these have been analysed
comprehensively by the author elsewhere.6 In this Article, the author deliberately adopts a
narrow perspective focusing on the danger that the overall tenor of United States’ actions
portends.
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The UN and Terrorism-An Awkward Embrace
Modern forms of terrorism began in earnest in the 1960s with the world emerging from
colonialism and state-sponsored racism.7 From Asia to Africa and the Middle East, many
states that sought freedom from foreign control and/or domination. In the face of vastly
superior, well-equipped and financed imperial armies, nationalist and anticolonialist
organisations resorted to terror violence, attacking civilian targets to instil a sense of terror in
the white community and white-dominated governments that ruled by force. With few
members, limited firepower, and comparatively few organisational resources, these groups
opted to rely on dramatic, often spectacular, bloody acts of violence to attract attention to
themselves and their cause. In this era “…‘terrorism’ was used to describe the violence
perpetrated by indigenous nationalist, anticolonialist organisations that arose throughout Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East in opposition to continued European rule.”8 Many countries owe
their independence at least in part to nationalist movements that used terrorism. Various
disenfranchised or exiled nationalist minorities also embraced terrorism as a means to draw
attention to their plight and generate international support for their cause. This modus
operandi did work and occasionally paid handsome dividends.9
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Abraham D Sofaer observes that “[n]o international consensus then existed that these terrorist
acts, including the killing of civilians, were unlawful. Politically motivated violence had a
favoured position in international affairs, including international law. The United Nations
General Assembly debates on terrorism in 1972 illustrate this point.”10 In the aftermath of the
Killings by Japanese terrorists sympathetic to the Palestinian cause at Lod Airport, Israel, and
the murders by PLO terrorists of the Black September organisation of members of the Israeli
Olympic team in Munich, Secretary-General Waldheim called on the Assembly to place on its
1972-1973 agenda an item entitled: “Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of
violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardise fundamental freedoms.”
The item ran into a storm of protest. “During the debates that followed that and later
proposals, it became clear that many states regarded acts of terror as lawful when undertaken
by persons deprived of basic human rights, dignity, freedom, or independence from foreign
occupation.”11

Ideological and geopolitical differences between states regarding the permissibility of
violence in various political contexts ensured that no broad generic approach would be taken
and obscured the fact that numerous states and organisations resort to clearly impermissible
violence when convenient to or desirable for their objectives. The growing lethality and
regularity of terrorist acts however transformed the matter as ideological motivations
increasingly replaced revolutionary goals. This convinced the international community of the
need to reach agreement that certain acts were criminal in all circumstances and should confer
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jurisdiction on all states to prosecute them, or alternatively an obligation to extradite persons
charged with such acts to other states for prosecution.
In order to mobilise consensus, the international community adopted a piecemeal approach to
combating terrorism, choosing to target very specific acts of terrorism, occurring in specific
situations, circumstances or places and generally providing for extradition and prosecution
regimes. The first terrorism conventions related to aviation security and followed a spate of
hijackings in the 1970s. They covered hostage taking, internationally protected persons
(including diplomats), and nuclear material. In the 1980s, the focus was on maritime
terrorism, following the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. It was not until December 1985 that
the UN General Assembly finally condemned “unequivocally ... as criminal, all acts, methods
and practices of terrorism.”12 Even that resolution, however, reaffirmed each people’s
inalienable right to self-determination and the legitimacy of struggles against colonial and
racist regimes and other forms of alien domination. Many state representatives affirmed the
right to engage in all necessary actions in these struggles. Subsequently, three further
conventions, on plastic explosives, terrorist bombings and terrorist financing, were negotiated
in the 1990s wrapping up efforts under the aegis of the UN to address and combat terrorism in
the 20th century.13

The law enforcement approach initially predominated counter-terrorism responses. This
approach considers terrorist events as purely criminal acts to be addressed by the domestic
criminal justice system and its components. It ensures due process and is a more precise
instrument for meting out individualised justice. Despite the clear-cut positives that the
domestic legal enforcement framework offers, it has proved to be inadequate. In the mid1980s States (notably Israel and the United States) begin to suggest that terrorist acts might be
12
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approached from a conflict management perspective, rather than exclusively from a law
enforcement viewpoint. The belief is that only the use of armed force will result in the degree
of decisive action that will minimise the likelihood that offenders will go unpunished. It is
argued that terrorists must be seen, not as criminals, but as persons jeopardizing national
security.14

With the end of the Cold War, acts generally described as “terrorism” proliferated in
frequency and severity. The rise of globalisation and religious extremism on one hand, and
the increasing accessibility and availability of weapons and technology on the other enabled
well-financed and organised terrorist organisations to transform themselves into global outfits
with greater reach and lethality.15 The appeal of terrorism as a low-cost, relatively low-risk,
activity with possibilities of high yield in terms of publicity, weakening of the victim or
infliction of harm has always been the primary magnet to terror outfits.16 Globalisation and
technology was quickly enhancing the capabilities of the outfits. With less confrontation and
more cooperation between states in the post-Cold War era, terrorism soon gained the
recognition that Cold War ideological and political squabbles prevented it from gaining-a
pernicious and underestimated threat to international peace and security.

There is no doubt that terrorism is an evil that States should combat aggressively. Terrorism
aims at killing the innocent and the unarmed. It has no ethics or conscience. Nonetheless, it
should not be forgotten that countries have many tools they can use in their fight against
terrorism including covert actions, and a variety of economic sanctions against a state or
14
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group that supports terrorists.17 These sanctions include freezing assets, denying credit or
investment funds to countries supporting terrorists, and working with multilateral banks to
block loans.

The author is inclined to concur with Joseph Thomas’ observation that the rise and threat
posed by international terrorism is the third world war which is upon us in all its ferocity. It
may be a war without end, but it should be fought with courage.18 However it is his belief
that: “This war calls for merciless punitive action, not thoughtless murders,”19 which the
author takes issue with. Massive military force however selectively and carefully carried out
will always lead to mistakes and the mistakes will inevitably be counted in numerous
unnecessary deaths of innocent civilians. As Professor Christopher Blakesley cautions: “Care
must be taken to ensure that international and domestic action taken to obtain justice and to
prosecute perpetrators does not fall into the same trap that ensnared those who committed the
crimes. If we allow ourselves to descend to simple vengeance, we are lost.”20

Terrorists are elusive and more so when States turn their back on their international
responsibilities and obligations and grant them save havens and support. However, these
failings do not justify a resort to vigilante justice. Unilateral solutions fuelled by nationalistic
agendas are bound to tear the fabric of restraint that is central to the international regime on
the use of force. It is all too easy to reach the simple solution of eliminating the enemy but
much harder to practically implement without the use of raw military power and thus a move
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to centralise power as a medium of international relations. Such a move ensures that
inevitably international rule of law becomes part of the casualty toll.21

Changing Gear without Engaging International law
The devastating consequences of the attacks of September 11 led President George Bush Jr to
declare a “war” on terrorism. The first stage of this war was a full-scale military operation in
Afghanistan, which destroyed the Taliban and Al Qaeda as fighting forces, and replaced the
Taliban regime with an internationally approved transition government. But the United States
was soon squandering the legal and political capital when it turned its focus on Iraq.
“Operation Iraqi Freedom” generally lacked support by the UN and most sovereign states
including some key traditional US allies.

The rapid fizzling of international support for the “Operation Iraqi” despite the abundance of
the same when the United States launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” against
Afghanistan was premised on what was viewed as a lack of appreciation by the United States
of the complications to the international system that this engendered. This was more so
considering that the United States had flagged that it was embarking on a new and
dramatically different policy in dealing with terrorism than it has followed for many years.22

In his first Union of the Speech address after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Mr Bush’s
bellicose remarks regarding the “axis of evil” raised international concerns that the war on
terrorism may spread in terms of geography and nature. The international community
(including United States’ allies) “… reacted with alarm and repudiation, fearing that the
president’s rhetoric signalled a unilateral escalation of global tension. They also objected to
21
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the overall mood of the address, and in particular, the pugnacious way in which President
Bush promised to deal with those who threatened American security.”23 One-by- one foreign
leaders scolded the United States for its defiant, go-it alone attitude.24 Sensing the Bush
administration’s heightened interest in Iraq, the EU, China, Russia, and Germany warned the
United States not to attack Iraq without first working through international diplomatic
channels.25 The appeals by the international community however fell on deaf years. This was
not surprisingly since President Bush’s September 12, 2002 address to the UN General
Assembly, a year after the September 11 bombings had set the terms of the debate.26 In that
address, “[r]emarkably, Bush succeeded both in flashing his multilateralist credentials and in
portending the death of multilateralism if the UN failed to follow the American lead.”27
It wasn’t lost on the international community that the Bush Administration was increasingly
gravitating towards unilateralism and a nationalistic agenda evidenced by the administration’s
rejection of several international agreements resulting in feverish charges, especially from
allies abroad, that the United States was behaving unilaterally.28 “The administration’s critics
argued that American unilateralism endangered the global cooperation that is the only means
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through which common problems can be solved and common interests advanced. The
uncompromising rhetoric used by the president and other [US] government leaders in
describing how the United States would confront Iraq—with or without allied support—
provided more ammunition for those who denounced the Bush administration’s perceived
unilateralism.”29 The belligerence in the rhetoric of the Bush administration (especially in
light of United States’ military might) painted a troubling picture of not allowing its agenda to
be deterred or diluted by the strictures of international law or the preferences of the
international community. If allies agree with the United States position, they should join the
crusade; if not, the implication is that they are soft on terrorism and off course for states
outside the close circle—sympathisers.

Marginalising the UN and International Law?
It is abundantly clear that the push for a state-centric determination on the use of lethal
military force to counter terrorism is exerting tremendous stress on international cooperation
and goodwill and contributing to mounting anti-American sentiment. It is significant that in a
break with the past, a justification under law was not part of the Bush Administration’s public
position when it began discussing an invasion of Iraq.30 Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell
observes that: “This is one of the rare occasions since the adoption of the UN Charter that the
United States has been so disinterested in international law as to not provide an explanation as
to how a major use of armed force would comply with the law.”31 Professor O’Connell then
sums up the matter thus:
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The significance of this is not that the United States has always acted consistently with international
law and now suddenly it is not. The United States has plainly violated international law on the use of
force in the past. The difference is that now the prevailing view sees no need to offer explanations.
The United States need not show how it has acted consistently with the principles of the community.
The United States is above the law. That is a significant departure from the past that may well have
serious negative consequences for future legal restraints on the use of force.32

In the invasion of Iraq, US planners give little indication that they were concerned with the
law of self-defence. “In the past the United States has sought to characterise its uses of force
as within the international rule of law - even if that meant manipulating facts as in the cases of
Vietnam and Grenada. The United States has officially argued its uses of force were lawful.
The invasion of Iraq, however, presents a significant new development in which it seems
some United States foreign policy planners apparently believe that the United States has a
privileged, exceptional position in international relations and that puts it above international
law.33

The stance that no multilateral organisation authorisation or other justification under law to
invade Iraq was necessary will have profound consequences if permitted to be the guiding
principle of the United States in its crusade against terror. The most powerful country on
earth cannot afford to be solely preoccupied with self-preservation.34 Undoubtedly, the United
States enjoys a position of preponderant military, economic and political might and privilege
in the international community. “America is no mere international citizen. It is the dominant
power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome. Accordingly America is in a
position to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new realities.”35 But this surely does
not entail tearing apart the international framework and unravelling many decades of hard
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won battles to discipline sovereign excesses. If this be so, Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell
notes that:

Allowing the United States to move to a position above the law will have repercussions for the law.
Those repercussions will unlikely be the ones the United States wants. The United States wants an
orderly world under the rule of law for everyone, but some also want the United States to have a right
to pick and choose the rules it obeys. This is not how law works. Law is based on a psychological
element of belief and commitment. When these are absent, there can be no law. If the United States
breaks this fiction and declares itself above the law, it will help break down the commitment to law
generally in the international community.36

Resort to force, even when lawful requires great care. Mistakes or excessive collateral damage
can undermine its effectiveness. “While the United States may act unilaterally in its selfdefence, it must be prepared to defend its actions or to admit and pay for its mistakes.”37 But
such mistakes (likely to be colossal as Iraq demonstrates) will result in undermining rather
than furthering the crusade against terrorism. Opponents of an independent right for states to
determine the use of military force outside the dictates of the UN Charter as a counter
measure against terrorism criticise the proposition as an imprudent expansion of the legitimate
use of force with limitless potential for misuse. These opponents echo the fears expressed by
the International Court of Justice over fifty years ago in the Corfu Channel case:

[The ICJ] can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force
such as has in the past given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot find a place in
international law. It is still less admissible in the particular form it would take here—it would be
reserved for the most powerful states.38

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan echoed this position in 1999 when he commented that
“enforcement actions without Security Council authorisation threaten the very core of the
international security system founded on the Charter of the United Nations. Only the Charter
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provides a universally accepted legal basis for the use of force.”39 It may be prudent for selfdefence not to expand so rapidly that it erases the preclusion of unilateral recourse to armed
force. After all, as Professor Schachter observes, “[t]he absence of binding judicial or other
third-party determinations relating to the use of force adds to the apprehension that a more
permissive rule of self-defence will open the way to further disregard of the limits on force.”40
As Professor Byers and Simon Chesterman observe:

a select group of states (such as Western liberal democracies, or perhaps the United States alone)
agreeing on criteria [for intervention] amongst themselves—would seriously undermine the current
system of international law: It would also greatly undermine the position of the United Nations as an
effective organisation in the field of peace and security, after the decade in which, despite some
obvious failures, it achieved more than in the previous half-century.41

“The Bush Doctrine, perceiving the failure of deterrence to inhibit terrorists and ‘rogue’ states
that possess the will and the means to wreak catastrophic destruction, avers that the terrorist
threat has become an overriding threat to national survival that trumps existing international
law. The United States feels it cannot afford to let terrorists have any safe harbour from which
to craft a future catastrophic attack on America.”42 The United States is forceful in averring
that ... “[t]he war on terror will not be won on the defensive.”43 What the United States seems
to be ignoring or giving scant attention is the fact that “… the Article 2(4) prohibition is not a
one-sided provision that hampers only the United States policy; it applies to all members of
the United Nations. Accordingly, an erosion of the prohibition on the use of force enables not
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only the United States, but also all other states to use force more freely.”44 United States
policymakers, perhaps considering other states too weak to exploit the new principles it seeks
to write into the rule book for the use of force may be willing to tolerate this situation.

Though the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have from a technical point of view
“been fought and won, a battle still rages over the legitimacy of the United States’ actions
under international law. As the world hegemon, the actions of the United States receive a
great deal of attention.”45 The United States chose not to act within the parameters of
international law when it invaded Iraq without proper authority leaving the international
community angry and frustrated. It did not help that the action occurred in the shadow of
lowered world opinion of the United States due to its unilateral moves regarding the
environment and missile defence.46 The invasion of Iraq served only to reinforce the fears that
the international community had of a hyper-power determined to have its way whether
through law or simply raw power.

The anger of the international community was not based on any support for Saddam regime
which the international community was well aware supported terror in one form or another.
Rather it was premised on the United States determination to invade Iraq based on faulty and
dodgy intelligence which served to undermine the United States claim of a right to act
unilaterally against Saddam’s regime on behalf of the interests of the international
community. In essence the United States seemed fixated with the need to get rid of the
murderous regime—not a bad mindset—but disturbing when it sought to wrap up its political
44
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agenda together with the interests of the international community. The spill over effect is that
it opened the door to other countries to justify violating the law in the same manner-by tying
the interests of the international community together with national foreign policy goals. Thus,
this move by the United States could unwittingly establish a dangerous precedent.

The Future
The events of September 11 establish that terrorism poses the most serious threat to
international order and global human rights in the 21st century. Terrorism also represents a
grave crime under international law. The war on terror has the UN Charter regime on the use
of force enrolled in an era of change. Within the United Nations regime-the system of
collective security, self-defence is subject to restrictions (in other words is finite). The “Bush
Doctrine” and similar doctrines or justifications are running against the grain of Article 2(4).
Considering that an amendment to the UN Charter is near impossible, a change in customary
law might be a way. As Professor M Bothe points out, “[a] usual procedure to modify
customary law is to break it and to accompany the breach by a new legal claim.”47 The case
for a change of the restrictive concept of pre-emptive self-defence is made by the National
Security Strategy:

Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive
posture. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not
permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.48

The argument that a state cannot wait to absorb a potential legal attack before acting is not
new. Indeed, the traditional approach has always had the drawback of depriving a potential
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victim of the possibility to choose the most advantageous moment to fight a danger which
may be extreme. It has been used by Israel to justify a number of incursions into the territory
of its neighbours, and has been rejected by the Security Council.49 The prohibition of the use
of force, including the prohibition of anticipatory self-defence, has developed in international
practice and doctrine despite the awareness of this drawback. “Does President Bush’s
National Security Strategy constitute a step in this direction?”50 Any new rule to be created
would have to give an adequate answer to many thorny questions. Professor M Bothe raises
some of these questions thus:

How to define and limit a possibly expanded right of self-defence? How serious must the threat be? Is
possession of weapons of mass destruction enough? Who is threatened and who may attack? What
about the possession of nuclear arms by India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel? What precisely
distinguishes them (if there is a difference), in legal terms, from Iraq? What does ‘harbouring’
terrorists mean? There must be knowledge. But if there is, what kind of effort is a state required to
make in order not to be considered as harbouring terrorists?51

Satisfactory answers to these questions are not at hand. All too easily, a standard of
reasonableness boils down to subjectivity and speculation. The National Security Strategy
seems to recognise the dilemma, in particular the risk of abuse: “... nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression.”52 This sentence is followed, however, by a somewhat
enigmatic postulate: “Yet in an age where the enemies of civilisation openly and actively seek
the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers
gather”.53

The prickly issue is whether this seems to imply a differentiation between (other) “nations”
and the United States? And thus seek to create a different yardstick for the world’s sole
49
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superpower. An essential argument for maintaining the restrictive concept is the problem of
vagueness and the possibility of abuse since this is the greatest vulnerability of the prohibition
of the use of force. The impossibility of placing any legal limit on the exception means that
the validity of the prohibition of the use of force itself will be in jeopardy.

The attempt to create a rule which is unable to give a workable definition of permissible force
might end in the abolition of the prohibition of the use of force altogether, as previously
occurred. This would mean destroying one of the most important and salutary cultural and
political achievements of the 20th century. That danger is all the more real as the rule
prohibiting the use of force is particularly vulnerable for another reason as well. This rule was
not really developed by state practice. There has never been a consistent practice of abstention
from the use of force. What changed after World War I was the reaction of relevant actors
against the use of force.

If we want to maintain international law as a restraint on the use of military force, we should
very carefully watch any attempt on the part of opinion leaders to argue that military force is
anything other than an evil that has to be avoided. The lessons of history are telling. If we
revert to such broad concepts, such as the just war concept, to justify military force we are
stepping on a slippery slope, one which would make us slide back into the 19th century when
war was not illegal.

It is important that states remember that despite the weaknesses and perceived failings of the
UN in dealing with terrorism, the UN is not sitting on its hands. Even before the September
11 attacks, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Millennium Declaration it among
other things urged a concerted action against international terrorism by states as well as their
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accession to all relevant international conventions.54 About a year later, on 28 September
2001, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1373, reaffirming its unequivocal condemnation of September 11 attacks.55 The resolution
also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the implementation of
resolution 1373 by all States and spearhead attempts to increase the capability of States to
fight terrorism. Shortly thereafter, at the behest of the Secretary-General in October 2001 the
Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism was established. Its purpose has
been to identify the longer-term implications and broad policy dimensions of terrorism for the
United Nations and to formulate recommendations on the steps that the United Nations
system might take to address the issue.

It may well be that the international community is committed to reshaping the paradigm on
the use of force to counter terrorism and will one day accept some instances of pre-emptive
use of force. This it is submitted, is a much safer approach to the interpretation and
development of the jus ad bellum than loosening any real restraint by boiling it down to a rule
of reason—a self-destructive mechanism for the prohibition of the use of force. While there
are serious doubts about the wisdom of the traditional rule which strictly limits anticipatory
self-defence, practicable substantive legal restraints on the use of pre-emptive force are not
readily available. Loosening these limits without setting out workable limits is dangerous.

Conclusion
Despite the horror of September 11, the “Bush Doctrine”, if taken to its logical conclusion, is
too all-encompassing to conform to even an expansive reading of the UN Charter. No doubt
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the September 11 terrorist attacks reinforced the proposition that the UN Charter system is illequipped to deal with contemporary security threats. However part of the problem is a result
of the Cold War and the obstructionist politics that accompanied it.56 Despite instances of
resort to military action to counter terrorism in the Cold War, the actions were often shrouded
in a jumble of half-truths not helped by a confusing mish-mash of legal justifications. The end
result is that the illusion of self-defence was (and still is) used and misused preventing the
evolution of any meaningful state practice and opinio juris thus retarding the development of
meaningful international discourse.

“Antiterrorism efforts must ultimately be judged by whether they prevent attacks. Any
conceivable deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions of low-level conspirators is lessened by
the fact that they take years to complete and may take place after additional attacks. Law
enforcement activity cannot be expected to shut down terrorist organisations operating in
hostile and uncooperative states…”57 It is a reality that criminal prosecutions are generally
ineffective in deterring fundamentalist terrorist groups able to recruit individuals willing to
sacrifice their lives in suicide bombings. These terrorists are crazed killers, as prepared for
sacrifice as good soldiers.58 However n the face of the ever present reality that “Al Qaeda and
similar organisations limit the damage any individual can inflict by functioning in loose-knit
cells,”59 the fight against terrorism cannot be won purely by force or by causing the other side
an unacceptable rate of casualties. Professor Christopher Blakesley cautions:

International and domestic law equip us to extricate ourselves from the ‘infernal dialect’ of violence;
they provide the means whereby we may avoid accepting or participating in the oppression or the
slaughter of innocents, even by our own acquiescence. It is error of the highest order to accept the
56
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ideologue’s argument that, because some nations or rebel groups participate in oppression or other
terror-violence, it is inevitable and therefore necessary to combat it with like conduct. It is practical
and necessary to alter this vision. To commit evil acts because of perceived or even actual evil acts
perpetrated by the object of our acts is to accept the evil as ours and to become evil. Self-defence
under the rule of law does not include the use of innocents as tools. We must re-establish the vision of
a world made up of human beings controlled by the rule of law and morality, not by raw power.60

The current climate dictates that there is a need “… to realign the existing rules on the use of
force to match the altered international security environment and yet maintain meaningful
limits on the use of force.”61 Viable solutions can be reached but only by States maintaining
the centrality of the UN even in the face of unconventional threats.

The UN is well aware that it will remain relevant if it explores and develops new avenues for
dealing with the threat of international terrorism. Obviously measures from another era that
simply impose a limit on the use of force that frustrates a nation’s ability to defend itself will
result in the UN being marginalised as states will fall back on the expansive right of selfpreservation and inevitably place their own survival above adherence to an international law
system that cannot guarantee their security and the safety of their citizens. The signs from the
UN are good, patience and support for its efforts is what is needed.
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